Quality Is Not a Safety Proxy Under Quantization
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Computer Science > Machine Learning
Title:Quality Is Not a Safety Proxy Under Quantization
Abstract:Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39$\times$ more quantization error overall ($p < 5 \times 10^{-7}$), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows ($\kappa = 0.873$, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.
| Comments: | 21 pages, 6 figures. Preprint |
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2606.10154 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2606.10154v1 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.10154
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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