Denoising-Aware Inversion: Revealing Privacy Risks in Noise-Protected Text Embeddings
Mirrored from arXiv — Machine Learning for archival readability. Support the source by reading on the original site.
Computer Science > Machine Learning
Title:Denoising-Aware Inversion: Revealing Privacy Risks in Noise-Protected Text Embeddings
Abstract:Dense text embeddings are widely used in data mining, retrieval, and downstream machine learning systems due to their compact and semantically rich representations, but recent embedding inversion attacks have shown that they can expose substantial information about the original text, leading to serious privacy leakage risks. A common defense is to release perturbed embeddings by adding Gaussian noise, which is simple yet effective against standard inversion attacks and does not significantly degrade embedding utility for downstream tasks. However, it remains unclear whether such noise-protected embeddings are sufficiently safe against adaptive attackers that explicitly account for the perturbation process. In this paper, we study text embedding inversion in a noise-protected setting, where the attacker can observe only noisy embeddings and has no access to clean embedding targets. We first analyze why existing generative inversion methods fail under this setting and identify a "Double Noise Trap", which fundamentally prevents standard generative inversion models from achieving high-quality reconstruction. To address this challenge, we propose DAEI, a denoising-aware embedding inversion pipeline that combines a residual denoising autoencoder with generative text inversion where the denoiser is trained in an unsupervised manner using Stein's unbiased risk estimate to enable denoising from noisy observations alone. Extensive experiments show that DAEI achieves approximately 154\% relative improvement in BLEU over the existing generative inversion baseline, while also improving token-level F1 and ROUGE-L by 32--60\%. The promising inversion performance of DAEI challenges the prevailing assumption that simple Gaussian perturbation is sufficient to prevent sensitive information leakage from embedding representations.
| Comments: | 11 pages, 3 figures. Accepted by IEEE ICDM 2026 |
| Subjects: | Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2608.18610 [cs.LG] |
| (or arXiv:2608.18610v1 [cs.LG] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.18610
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
|
Access Paper:
- View PDF
- HTML (experimental)
- TeX Source
Current browse context:
References & Citations
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article
Demos
Recommenders and Search Tools
arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
More from arXiv — Machine Learning
-
SLM-Conditioned Hierarchical Relation Routing for Labeled Property Graph Learning
Aug 28
-
NeuronFuzz: Safety Neuron Guided Fuzzing for LLM Safety Evaluation
Aug 28
-
Pruning Binarized Neural Networks: A Dedicated Framework and Globally Weighted Algorithms
Aug 28
-
Muon with Finite Newton-Schulz: The Smoothing Benefit in Nonsmooth Nonconvex Optimization
Aug 28
Discussion (0)
Sign in to join the discussion. Free account, 30 seconds — email code or GitHub.
Sign in →No comments yet. Sign in and be the first to say something.